


DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE



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MEMORANDUM TO: S/ - . . . Brubeck  
FROM: SA - James C. Thomson, Jr.

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum of conversation prepared by Ambassador Rubin following his return on meeting with Ambassador Wornat. Mr. Rubin gave the original of this paper to the President this morning, and he requests that you arrange for reproduction and distribution of additional copies to the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for the relevant Assistant Secretaries, Mr. Wornat, Mr. Stevenson, and any others who you think might be interested in seeing this memorandum.

Please return this copy for our files.

Many thanks.

**TRANSCRIBED PAGE FOLLOWS**

(Cover Memo Only)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: S/S Mr. Brubeck  
FROM: James C. Thompson

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum of conversation prepared by Ambassador Bowles following his [ ? ] on meeting yesterday with Ambassador Dobrynin. Mr. Bowles gave the original of this paper to the President this morning, and he requests that S/S arrange for reproduction and distribution of additional copies to the Secretary, the Other Secretaries the relevant Assistant Secretaries, Mr. Bundy, Mr. [ ? ], Ambassador Stevenson, and any others who you think might be interested in seeing this memorandum.

Please return this copy for our files.

Many thanks.

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November 15, 1962

From: Chester Bowles

Memorandum of Conversation with  
Ambassador Dobrynin on Thursday, November 15th  
2808 N Street

Following the memorial service for Mrs. Roosevelt,  
Ambassador Dobrynin came to my house at 2808 N Street for  
lunch. This was a follow-up to our luncheon at the Soviet  
Embassy on the 13th of October just before I left for Africa.

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In closing, the conversation turned to Southeast Asia. I stated that I had talked that morning with Averell Harriman who was deeply concerned about the situation in Laos. Although,

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Souvenna Phouma was doing his best, the Pathet Lao were continuing to create difficulties. It was clear to everyone that the main source of trouble is in Hanoi. What could the USSR do to help settle this question?

Dobrynin replied that we could count on the willingness of the USSR to do its utmost in regard to Laos. Mr. Khrushchev felt that he had a specific commitment to President Kennedy in this area which he intended to carry out.

I suggested that the real trouble-makers in Southeast Asia were the Viet Minh. Was it not possible for the USSR to get better control of the situation either through supplies or through other means of dealing with the Hanoi government? As long as the Viet Minh continued to supply the Viet Cong there would be trouble in Vietnam, and we would have to stand our ground.

We could not allow the Viet Minh to upset the South Vietnam government, and we had the capacity to keep them

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from doing so. However, the sooner we could settle these problems, the fewer lives would be lost, and the less danger would exist of providing an opening for the Chinese.

As we walked towards the door, I again reminded Dobrynin that he must not assume that the views I expressed necessarily represented those of my government; that I had simply expressed my own frank thoughts in the hope that they might be helpful to him in understanding the way we looked at the present situation.

Throughout this two-hour free-wheeling, give-and-take conversation, Dobrynin was relaxed and pleasant; he talked with a general air of frankness.

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